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STRATEGIC ENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen
At times, it is difficult to maintain focus on strategic ends while embroiled in a
conflict. This is especially true as soldiers and marines battle Iraqi insurgents under
close media scrutiny, while pundits question the Iraq war as a means to the Global War
on Terror (GWOT) ends. As a topical issue of rectitude, the decision to invade Iraq
needs to pass to the historians—continued debate on that issue is a distraction. As a
question of strategy, the toppling of Iraq has provided the United States with an
opportunity to strike at the heart of al Qaeda and its ideological kin, which heretofore
have been protected by the residual effects of Cold War inertia. Ultimately, the GWOT
will be decided in the Middle East, so sooner or later, the campaign strategy has to
converge there.
Perhaps it is unfair to say, but the Middle East appears to excel in two areas:
pumping out oil and spawning extremists. Certainly, the vast majority of Middle East
states provide a permissible environment for the litany of organizations that have no
qualms in using terrorism to promote their agendas. Dysfunctional and corrupt
governance, atrocious economic and social conditions, and anti-Israeli exhortations to
divert domestic attention have created fertile recruitment for agents of terrorism. As
long as the bloodshed was limited to the region, the situation was lamentable but
manageable. Once al Qaeda internationalized its activities and started a global
insurgency aimed at toppling the United States, the dynamics of international
diplomacy changed dramatically. What was once unthinkable—transforming the
political landscape of the Middle East—became achievable.
The U.S. strategic goal in the Middle East campaign must be the creation of stable,
progressive, and democratized states. Given the vast inequities between the ruling
class and hoi polloi, needed reforms are not going to come about through enlightened
diplomacy. In this vein, the liberation of Iraq has provided the physical and
psychological beachhead for the prosecution of the Middle East campaign, but any
expectation that the remaining regimes would welcome democracy or would accept the
inevitable is downright naive. Regional democratization must be nurtured, nudged,
and sometimes asserted. Having asserted U.S. authority in the region, the next critical
objective must be the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It is important to bear in mind that campaign strategy is determined by the
probability of success and not the ease of execution, as the ongoing insurgency in Iraq
illustrates. The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be difficult and bitter, but also
feasible. Amazingly, the United States and the European Union have been far too
patient with the chicanery of both the Israeli government and Palestinian authority.
Given the pathological cycle of violence to which the conflict has descended, the United
States and Europe must recognize that Israel and the Palestinian authority are incapable
of conflict resolution diplomatically. U.S./EU resolve can be best demonstrated by
implementing the peace plan with an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, the

insertion of peace enforcement troops into the West Bank and Gaza Strip is essential.
No one should harbor illusions with this course of action. Neither side will be happy
with the arrangements and will attempt to derail its implementation with violence. But
the evenhandedness of the peace enforcement will eventually ameliorate the most
divisive issue in the Middle East. Understandably, national policymakers cannot ignore
domestic political pressures, but neither should these pressures sway them from
implementing a policy that reaps such rewards and permits the continuation of the
GWOT strategy.
With a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the impetus of regional reform will
become considerable, with the United States and EU applying more economic and
diplomatic incentives and less coercion for the institution of deep political, economic,
and social reforms.
A loss of U.S. resolve resulting from the insurgency in Iraq would be a monumental
tragedy because it would give extremist groups respite. They will use the reprieve to
reorganize and continue the global insurgency and eventually will acquire a weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) capability. The United States can avoid this outcome by
reducing the resources of extremist organizations to such a degree that they lack the
funding, recruitment, and sophistication to acquire and employ WMD. Cleansing the
Middle East of extremist spider nests is the most effective means to the GWOT ends.

